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MODIFYING THE TROPICAL VERSION OF STICKEL’S KEY
EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
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Abstract. A tropical version of Stickel’s key exchange protocol was suggested by Grigoriev
and Sphilrain [3] and successfully attacked by Kotov and Ushakov [5]. We suggest some
modifications of this scheme that use commuting matrices in tropical algebra and discuss
some possibilities of attacks on these new modifications. We suggest some simple heuristic
attacks on one of our new protocols, and then we generalize the Kotov and Ushakov attack
on tropical Stickel’s protocol and discuss the application of that generalised attack to all
our new protocols.
Keywords: Stickel’s protocol and Tropical Algebra and Cryptography and Commuting
matrices
MSC 2010: 15A80, 94A60
1. Introduction
Tropical (or max-plus) semiring is the set Rmax = R ∪ {−∞} equipped with the
operations of tropical addition a ⊕ b = max{a, b} and multiplication a ⊗ b = a + b.
Note that the tropical addition is not invertible, but the multiplication is a group
operation. The multiplicative inverse of a ∈ R equals −a, and will be commonly
denoted by a−. The operations of tropical addition and multiplication are extended
to matrices and vectors in the usual way.
Tropical algebra is a semiring, which means in particular that the addition oper-
ation does not admit inverses. Furthermore, the class of invertible matrices in this
algebra is very scarce and the matrix inversion cannot be used by the attacker. For
this reason, Grigoriev and Shpilrain [3] suggested the tropical algebra as a platform
to modify Stickel’s Protocol. One of their ideas is that using the tropical algebra
The research has been supported by EPSRC Grant EP/P019676/1.
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instead of the classical algebra is promising since matrices in the tropical algebra
are usually not invertible and the decomposition problem cannot be simplified in
general. Kotov and Ushakov demonstrated the weakness of Stickel’s key exchange in
the tropical scheme by showing that they can attack it successfully without having
to solve any ”tough” problem [5].
The main idea of this paper is to consider some modifications of Stickel’s protocol
using classes of commuting matrices other than matrix powers or matrix polynomi-
als. In one of the cases that we consider, the use of a different class of commuting
matrices allows us to share less information with the attacker. This seems to be quite
promising, however in this case we can also construct a simple and rather successful
heuristic attack on the protocol. We also show that the ideas of Kotov-Ushakov
attack apply to all protocols that we construct, thus leading to an appropriate gen-
eralized version of this attack that can be specialized to a variety of protocols.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start with some basic definitions
and key notions of tropical matrix algebra. In Section 3 we introduce two new
classes of commuting matrices in tropical algebra. One of them, based on the work
of Jones [2] on the roots of some special tropical matrices, extends the notions of
matrix powers and polynomials for such matrices, and the other extends a class of
commuting matrices found by Linde and de la Puente [6]. In Section 4 we introduce
new protocols using these new classes of commuting matrices. Then, in Section 5
we recall the Kotov-Ushakov attack [5] on the tropical Stickel protocol, prove that it
actually works, extend it to one of our new protocols and analyse its performance in
practice. In Section 6 we construct some heuristic attacks on another protocol which
we introduced before, and construct a generalized version of Kotov-Ushakov attack
which applies to all our new protocols.
2. Elements of tropical algebra
Let us start with introducing some basic definitions. By [m] and [n] we denote
{1, . . . ,m} and {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 1 (Tropical matrix addition and multiplication). For c ∈ Rmax and
A ∈ Rm×nmax one defines c⊗A by
(c⊗A)ij = c⊗ aij ∀i ∈ [m], ∀j ∈ [n].
For two matrices A = (aij) ∈ Rm×nmax and B = (bij) ∈ Rm×nmax , one defines A⊕B by
(A⊕B)ij = aij ⊕ bij ∀i ∈ [m], ∀j ∈ [n].
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For matrix A = (aij) ∈ Rm×pmax and matrix B = (bij) ∈ Rp×nmax , we define A ⊗ B ∈




aik ⊗ bkj ,∀i ∈ [m], ∀j ∈ [n].
The neutral element with respect to matrix multiplication can be characterized as
follows.
Definition 2 (Identity matrix). Matrix I ∈ Rn×nmax is called a tropical identity
matrix if its entries are
Iij =
{
0, if i = j,
−∞, if i 6= j,
for i, j ∈ [n].
In words, all diagonal entries of a tropical identity matrix are equal to 0 and all
off-diagonal entries are equal to −∞.
Tropical identity matrix I ∈ Rn×nmax satisfies A⊗ I = I ⊗ A = A for all A ∈ Rn×nmax ,
and it is a special case of the following.




di, if i = j,
−∞, if i 6= j,
for some di ∈ Rmax and i, j ∈ [n]. We also denote D = diag(d1, . . . , dn).
Diagonal matrices with finite diagonal entries are invertible: for any D =
diag(d1, . . . , dn) with di ∈ R for i ∈ [n], the inverse is D− = diag(d−1 , . . . , d−n ),
so that D− ⊗ D = D ⊗ D− = I. Diagonal matrices with finite entries form an
Abelian group. Another important group of invertible matrices consists of tropical
permutation matrices. For a permutation σ of {1, . . . , n}, the corresponding tropical
permutation matrix Pσ is defined by
Pσij =
{
0, j = σ(i),
−∞, otherwise.
Products of tropical diagonal and tropical permutation matrices are called tropical
monomial matrices. The group of tropical monomial matrices is precisely the group
of all invertible matrices in tropical matrix algebra (e.g., [1] Theorem 1.1.3).
Any matrix over Rmax can be written as a tropical linear combination of tropical
elementary matrices.
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Definition 4 (Elementary matrices). Let Eij ∈ Rn×nmax be a matrix with entries
(Eij)kl =
{
0, if k = i, l = j
−∞, otherwise.
for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and k, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Any matrix of this form is called a tropical elementary matrix.
Let us now consider the tropical matrix powers.
Definition 5 (Matrix powers).
A⊗k = A⊗A⊗ . . .⊗A︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
.
Tropical matrix powers are a natural extension of scalar tropical powers:
a⊗k = a⊗ a...⊗ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
= a+ ...+ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
= k × a,∀a ∈ Rmax, k ∈ N.
Also note that scalar tropical matrix powers can be easily defined for arbitrary real
exponents:
a⊗r = r × a, r ∈ R.
Furthermore, we can also consider tropical polynomials.
Definition 6 (Polynomials). Tropical polynomial is a function of the form




where ak ∈ Rmax for k = 0, 1, ..., d.
Here x can be a scalar or a square matrix of any dimension. As in the usual algebra,
any two tropical matrix powers or polynomials of the same matrix commute, and
therefore they can be used to build a tropical version of Stickel’s protocol.
Using the tropical matrix powers we can define a tropical analogue of (I −A)−1.
Definition 7 (Kleene stars). Suppose A ∈ Rn×nmax then denote A∗ = I⊕A⊕A⊗2⊕
. . .. If this series converges then it is called the Kleene star of A.
The Kleene stars can be characterized by the following well-known result, as idem-
potents with all diagonal entries equal to 0.
Proposition 1 (e.g., [1]). Let A ∈ Rn×nmax . Then A = B∗ if and only if A = A⊗2
and aii = 0 for all i.
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3. Two classes of commuting matrices
3.1. Jones matrices. Tropical polynomials are used in the tropical version of
Stickel’s protocol suggested by Grigoriev and Shpilrain. We now describe a special
kind of matrices considered by Jones [2], for which the notion of polynomial can be
extended.
Definition 8 (Jones matrices). Let A = (aij) be an n× n tropical matrix which
satisfies the following property:
(3.1) aij ⊗ ajk ≤ aik ⊗ ajj ∀i, j, k ∈ [n].
We call A a Jones matrix.
Notice that any Kleene star A ∈ Rn×nmax is a Jones matrix where ajj = 0 for all
j ∈ [n] and (3.1) reduces to aij ⊗ ajk ≤ aik for all i, j, k ∈ [n].
We will consider the following operation:
Definition 9 (Deformation). Let A = (aij) be a Jones matrix and α ∈ R. Matrix
A(α) = (a
(α)
ij ) defined by
(3.2) a
(α)
ij = aij ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)
⊗(α−1) ∀i, j ∈ [n].
is called a deformation of A.
The proof techniques of the following two theorems are very close to those in
Jones [2]. However, the statements were not explicitly stated and proved in that
work.
The next theorem shows that the class of Jones matrices is stable under deforma-
tions for α ≤ 1.
Theorem 3.1. If A is a Jones Matrix then A(α) is also a Jones matrix for any
α ≤ 1.





jk = aij ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)





jj = aik ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)
⊗(α−1) ⊗ a⊗αjj .
Hence the inequality which we want to prove is
aij ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(α−1) ⊗ ajk ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(α−1)
≤ aik ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α−1) ⊗ a⊗αjj .
(3.3)
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Multiplying both parts by (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(1−α) ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(1−α) ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(1−α)
we obtain that (3.3) is equivalent to
aij ⊗ ajk ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(1−α)
≤ aik ⊗ a⊗αjj ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)
⊗(1−α) ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(1−α).
(3.4)
To prove (3.4) we observe that
aij ⊗ ajk ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(1−α) = aij ⊗ ajk ⊗ (a⊗(1−α)ii ⊕ a
⊗(1−α)
kk )
≤ aik ⊗ ajj ⊗ (a⊗(1−α)ii ⊕ a
⊗(1−α)
kk ) = aik ⊗ ajj ⊗ a
⊗(1−α)





(aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(1−α) ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(1−α) ≥ a⊗(1−α)ii a
⊗(1−α)
jj ,




aik ⊗ a⊗αjj (aii ⊕ ajj)
⊗(1−α) ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(1−α)













Combining (3.5) and (3.6) yields (3.4). 
Note that in Theorem 3.1 α can be negative.
Matrix deformations do not always commute, as the following counterexample
shows.
Example 1. Let us consider matrix A =
 0 1 −1−1 0 −2
−1 0 −2




 0 1 −1−1 0 −2
−1 0 43
 and A(− 45 ) =





3 ) ⊗A(− 45 ) =










5 ) ⊗A(− 23 ) =








We can see that A(−
2
3 ) ⊗A(− 45 ) 6= A(− 45 ) ⊗A(− 23 ).
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Thus for α, β < 0 we have A(α) ⊗A(β) 6= A(β) ⊗A(α) in general. However, we can
obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.2. For any α, β ∈ R such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α+β ≤
1, let A be a Jones matrix. Then we have A(α) ⊗A(β) = A(β) ⊗A(α) = A(α+β).








aij ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(α−1) ⊗ ajk ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(β−1)
= aik ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α−1)a⊗βkk ⊕ a
⊗α





aij ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(α−1) ⊗ ajk ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(β−1).
(3.8)
Let us analyze the first two terms. When aii ≥ akk we obtain
aik ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α−1) ⊗ a⊗βkk ⊕ a
⊗α
ii ⊗ aik ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)
⊗(β−1)
= aik ⊗ a⊗βkk ⊗ a
⊗(α−1)
ii ⊕ aik ⊗ a
⊗(α+β−1)
ii = aik ⊗ a
⊗(α+β−1)
ii
= aik ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α+β−1).
(3.9)
The remaining case aii ≤ akk is treated similarly. As these two terms already
yield the required expression aik ⊗ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α+β−1), it remains to prove that the
remaining terms do not exceed it. Since
aij ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(α−1) ⊗ ajk ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(β−1)
≤ aik ⊗ ajj ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(α−1) ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(β−1),
it remains to show that
(3.10) ajj ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(α−1)(ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(β−1) ≤ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α+β−1).
which is equivalent to
(3.11) ajj ≤ (aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α+β−1)(aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(1−α)(ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(1−β).
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If aii ≥ akk then we have
(aii ⊕ akk)⊗(α+β−1) ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗(1−α) ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(1−β)
= a
⊗(α+β−1)
ii ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)
⊗(1−α−β) ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)⊗β ⊗ (ajj ⊕ akk)⊗(1−β)
≥ a⊗(α+β−1)ii ⊗ (aii ⊕ ajj)
⊗(1−α−β) ⊗ ajj ≥ ajj .
For the remaining case akk ≥ aii the same holds by symmetry. 
In particular, A(0) is an idempotent and plays the role of unity for A(α) for 0 ≤
α ≤ 1.
Corollary 1. Let A be a Jones matrix. Then A(0) satisfies A(α) ⊗A(0) = A(0) ⊗
A(α) = A(α) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
We also obtain the following result of Jones [2].
Corollary 2. Let A be a Jones matrix. Then A(k/l) = (A(1/l))⊗k holds for any
integer l > 0 and integer k : 1 ≤ k ≤ l.
Proof. We use a simple induction: if A(k/l) = (A(1/l))⊗k then A(k+1/l) = A(k/l) ⊗
A(1/l) = (A(1/l))⊗k ⊗A(1/l) = (A(1/l))⊗(k+1). 
Now we are able to extend the commutativity to all α and β from the unit interval
[0, 1]
Theorem 3.3. If A is a Jones matrix then A(α) ⊗ A(β) = A(β) ⊗ A(α) for any α
and β such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Proof. First consider the case of rational α = k1l1 and β =
k2
l2
. Then α = k1l2l1l2 and



























follows for any real α and β in [0, 1] since rational numbers are dense on the real line
and since the tropical arithmetic operations are continuous. 
We now discuss a connection between Kleene stars and Jones matrices. It helps
us to construct Jones matrices in practice. The key observations are that 1) the set
of Jones matrices is stable under scaling by diagonal matrices, 2) any Kleene star is
a Jones matrix.
Proposition 2. Let A be a Jones matrix and D and F be arbitrary diagonal
matrices. Then D ⊗A⊗ F is also a Jones matrix.
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Proof. Let A ∈ Rn×nmax , D = diag(d1, . . . , dn) and F = diag(f1 . . . , fn). The inequality
aij ⊗ ajk ≤ aik ⊗ ajj is equivalent to
(3.12) di ⊗ aij ⊗ fj ⊗ dj ⊗ ajk ⊗ fk ≤ di ⊗ aik ⊗ fk ⊗ dj ⊗ ajj ⊗ fj .
Observing that the entries of B = D ⊗A⊗ F are equal to bij = di ⊗ aij ⊗ fj for all
i and j, we obtain that (3.12) is the same as bij ⊗ bjk ≤ bik ⊗ bjj . 
As any Kleene star is a Jones matrix, we have the following immediate corollary.
It shows how Kleene stars can be used to construct Jones matrices.
Corollary 3. Let A be a Kleene star and D and F be arbitrary diagonal matrices.
Then D ⊗A, A⊗ F and D ⊗A⊗ F are Jones matrices.
The other way around, if we have a Jones matrix with finite diagonal entries, then
by means of an appropriate scaling it can be transformed to Kleene star.
Proposition 3. Let B ∈ Rn×nmax be a Jones matrix with finite diagonal entries.
Then
(i) For D = diag(b−11, . . . , b
−
nn), A1 = B ⊗D and A2 = D ⊗B are Kleene stars;
(ii) For D = diag(b
⊗−1/2
11 , . . . , b
⊗−1/2
nn ), A = D ⊗B ⊗D is a Kleene star.
Proof. The Kleene star inequality aij ⊗ ajk ≤ aik is a special case of (3.1) when
aii = 0. By Proposition 2, matrices A1, A2 and A satisfy (3.1). Then it suffices to
observe that all diagonal entries of these matrices are equal to 0. 
3.2. Linde–De la Puente matrices. Let us consider the following set of matrices,
which extends a set of matrices considered by Linde and De la Puente [6].
Definition 10 (Linde–De la Puente matrices). For arbitrary real number r ≤ 0
and real number k ≥ 0, we denote by [2r, r]kn the set of matrices A ∈ Rn×nmax such that
aii = k, for all i ∈ [n] and aij ∈ [2r, r] for i, j ∈ [n] and i 6= j. Matrices of this form
will be called Linde-De la Puente matrices.
We now show that any two matrices of this kind commute.
Theorem 3.4. Let A ∈ [2r, r]k1n , B ∈ [2s, s]k2n for any r, s ≤ 0 and aii = k1 ≥ 0,
bii = k2 ≥ 0 then
A⊗B = B ⊗A = k2 ⊗A⊕ k1 ⊗B.
Proof. For all i, j we have




= k1 ⊗ bij ⊕ k2 ⊗ aij ⊕
⊕
p/∈{i,j}
aip ⊗ bpj .
(3.13)
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We now argue that aip ⊗ bpj ≤ k1 ⊗ bij ⊕ k2 ⊗ aij . Indeed,
aip + bpj ≤ r + s ≤ max(2r, 2s) ≤ max(aij , bij) ≤ max(k1 + bij , k2 + aij).
Note that we used the well-known inequality r+s2 ≤ max(r, s). Then we obtain:




= k1 ⊗ bij ⊕ aij ⊗ k2
= (k2 ⊗A⊕ k1 ⊗B)ij
= (B ⊗A)ij ,
(3.14)
which shows the claim. 
Note that Linde and de la Puente obtained a special case of this result, for s = r
and k1 = k2 = 0.
We also observe the following commutativity property.
Theorem 3.5. Let A ∈ [2a, a]kn with a ≤ 0 and B = (bij) ∈ Rn×nmax . If 0 ≤ bij ≤ k
for all i, j ∈ [n] then A⊗B = B ⊗A.
Proof. For all i, j we have




= k ⊗ bij ,
(3.15)
since a ≤ 0 ≤ bij ≤ k. Similarly, for all i and j




= bij ⊗ k.
(3.16)
Hence A⊗B = B ⊗A. 
4. Protocols based on commuting matrices in tropical algebra
In this section, we discuss several implementations of public key exchange protocols
that use the new classes of commuting matrices in tropical algebra described in
Section 3. These implementations follow the idea of the tropical version of Stickel’s
protocol suggested by Grigoriev and Shpilrain [3], which we next recall.
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4.1. Tropical Stickel’s protocol of [3].
Protocol 1 (Tropical Stickel’s protocol of [3]).
Alice and Bob agree on public matrices A,B,W ∈ Rn×nmax . Then they exchange
messages as follows:
(1) Alice chooses two random tropical polynomials p1(x), p2(x) and sends U =
p1(A)⊗W ⊗ p2(B) to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses two random tropical polynomials q1(x), q2(x) and sends V =
q1(A)⊗W ⊗ q2(B) to Alice.
(3) Alice computes her secret key using a public key V which is obtained from
Bob and she has Ka = p1(A)⊗ V ⊗ p2(A).
(4) Bob also computes his secret key using Alice public key U and he obtains
Kb = q1(A)⊗ U ⊗ q2(B).
Note that both Alice and Bob using different public keys, i.e., public matrices V
and U respectively but since p1(A) ⊗ q1(A) = q1(A) ⊗ p1(A) and p2(B) ⊗ q2(B) =
q2(B)⊗p2(B), in the end they have the same secret keys Ka = Kb = p1(A)⊗q1(A)⊗
W ⊗ q2(B)⊗ p2(B).
4.2. Stickel’s protocol with quasi-polynomials. By Theorem 3.3, if A ∈ Rn×nmax
is a Jones matrix then its deformations A(α) and A(β) commute for any α, β : 0 ≤
α, β ≤ 1. Using this we can define a quasi-polynomial, where the role of monomials
is played by deformations.
Definition 11 (Quasi-polynomial). Let A ∈ Rn×nmax be a Jones matrix. Matrix B





for some finite subset R of rational numbers in [0, 1] and aα ∈ Rmax for α ∈ R.
The requirements that R consists of rational numbers and is finite are not neces-
sary in theory, but we have to impose them for practical implementation.
We now suggest another tropical implementation of Stickel’s protocol, where we
use tropical quasi-polynomials instead of tropical polynomials.
Protocol 2 (Stickel’s protocol using tropical quasi-polynomial).
Alice and Bob agree on some Jones matrices A,B ∈ Rn×nmax and an arbitrary matrix
W ∈ Rn×nmax .
(1) Alice chooses two random quasi-polynomials p′1(A), p
′
2(B) and computes U =
p′1(A)⊗W ⊗ p′2(B). Then Alice sends U to Bob.
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(2) Bob chooses two random quasi-polynomials q′1(A), q
′
2(B) and computes V =
q′1(A)⊗W ⊗ q′2(B). Then Bob sends V to Alice.
(3) Alice and Bob compute their secret keys Ka = p
′
1(A) ⊗ V ⊗ p′2(B) and
Kb = q
′
1(A)⊗ U ⊗ q′2(B), respectively.
Since p′1(A)⊗ q′1(A) = q′1(A)⊗p′1(A) and p′2(B)⊗ q′2(B) = q′2(B)⊗p′2(B), we have
a common secret key Ka = Kb.
4.3. Protocols using [2r, r]kn. The protocols that we next describe are based on
Theorems 3.4 and 3.5.
Protocol 3. Alice and Bob agree on a public matrix W ∈ Rn×nmax .
(1) Alice chooses matrices A1 ∈ [2a, a]k1n and A2 ∈ [2b, b]k2n for some random
a, b < 0 and k1, k2 ≥ 0. Then Alice sends U = A1 ⊗W ⊗A2 to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses matrices B1 ∈ [2c, c]l1n and B2 ∈ [2d, d]l2n for some random
c, d < 0 and l1, l2 ≥ 0. Then Bob sends V = B1 ⊗W ⊗B2 to Alice.
(3) Alice computes the secret key Ka = A1 ⊗ V ⊗A2 = A1 ⊗B1 ⊗W ⊗B2 ⊗A2
and Bob computes the secret key Kb = B1⊗U⊗B2 = B1⊗A1⊗W⊗A2⊗B2.
Protocol 4. Alice and Bob agree on a public matrix W ∈ Rn×nmax .
(1) Alice chooses matrix A1 ∈ [2a, a]kn and sends k to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses matrix B2 ∈ [2b, b]ln and sends l to Alice.
(3) Alice chooses matrix A2 with entries in [0, l], computes U = A1 ⊗W ⊗ A2
and sends it to Bob.
(4) Bob chooses matrix B1 with entries in [0, k], computes V = B1 ⊗W ⊗ B2
and sends it to Alice.
(5) Alice computes the secret key Ka = A1 ⊗ V ⊗A2 = A1 ⊗B1 ⊗W ⊗B2 ⊗A2
and Bob computes the secret key Kb = B1⊗U⊗B2 = B1⊗A1⊗W⊗A2⊗B2.
For both protocols, since A1 ⊗ B1 = B1 ⊗ A1 and A2 ⊗ B2 = B2 ⊗ A2, it is
immediate that Alice and Bob have the same secret key Ka = Kb.
5. Security of Stickel’s protocol with tropical quasi-polynomials
5.1. Attacking tropical Stickel’s protocol. To break any implementation of
Stickel’s protocol, we can follow the idea of cryptanalysis of classical Stickel’s proto-
col suggested in [7]. Applying this idea to Protocol 1, an attacker commonly named
Eve, needs to find matrix X and Y such that the following conditions hold:
A⊗X = X ⊗A, B ⊗ Y = Y ⊗B,(5.1)
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and
(5.2) X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U.
If Eve finds such X and Y then she can compute the key by multiplying V from
the left by X and from the right by Y . Then she will obtain
X ⊗ V ⊗ Y = X ⊗ q1(A)⊗W ⊗ q2(B)⊗ Y.
Since q1(A) commutes with X and q2(B) commutes with Y , we have
X ⊗ V ⊗ Y = q1(A)⊗X ⊗W ⊗ Y ⊗ q2(B)
= q1(A)⊗ U ⊗ q2(B) = Kb.
Kotov and Ushakov [5] observed that when we seek X and Y in the form of tropical
polynomials, solving this problem is reduced to solving a tropical one-sided system
where the variables satisfy certain conditions.




xα ⊗ yβ ⊗ (A⊗α ⊗W ⊗B⊗β − U) = E,
where E is a matrix of the same dimension as A or B with all entries equal to 0. As




(xα ⊗ yβ ⊗ Tαβγδ ) = 0, ∀γ, δ ∈ [n].
If we denote zαβ = xα ⊗ yβ then we find that this is a system of tropical linear
one-sided equations (of the type “A ⊗ x = b”) with coefficients Tαβγδ and unknowns
zαβ , where pairs γδ play the role of rows and pairs αβ play the role of columns. Such
systems are considered, e.g., in [1], but here we have an additional requirement that
unknowns have a special structure: zαβ = xα ⊗ yβ = xα + yβ .
These ideas motivate the following attack suggested by Kotov and Ushakov [5].
The goal of this attack is to solve (5.4). Following the usual optimization notation,
we denote by arg min
γ,δ














(2) Among all minimal covers of [n] × [n] by Sαβ , that is, all minimal subsets




Sαβ = [n]× [n].
find a cover for which the system
(5.7)
{
xα + yβ = cαβ , if (α, β) ∈ C,
xα + yβ ≤ cαβ if (α, β) /∈ C.
is solvable.
We now prove that Attack 1 actually works.
Theorem 5.1. Let A,B,W ∈ Rn×nmax and U be the message sent by Alice to Bob
in Protocol 1. If D is bigger than the maximal degree of any tropical polynomial









that satisfy X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U .
Proof. Since D is bigger than the maximal degree as any tropical polynomial used
by Alice and Bob, it is clear from the Protocol 1 that U = X ⊗W ⊗ Y where X
and Y satisfy (5.8) for some xα and yβ , for α, β ∈ {0, . . . , D}. Therefore, there exist
xα and yβ that satisfy (5.3) or, equivalently, (5.4). It is also clear that any xα and
yβ that solve (5.4) yield X and Y that satisfy (5.8) and X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U . Thus
the protocol can be broken by solving (5.4) and (with Tαβ defined using U that is
produced by the protocol) this system is solvable.
It remains to show that the Kotov-Ushakov attack actually finds a solution to





zαβ ⊗ Tαβγδ = 0, ∀γ, δ ∈ [n].
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According to the theory of A⊗ x = b, and namely [1] Theorem 3.1.1 and Corollary
3.1.2, we have
(1) If the solution exists then vector C = (cαβ) where cαβ = min
γ,δ
(−Tαβγδ ) is the
greatest solution.
(2) Vector Z = (zαβ) is a solution if and only if there exists a set C ⊆ {0, . . . , D}×
{0, . . . , D} such that (5.6) holds and zαβ = cαβ for all (α, β) ∈ C and zαβ ≤
cαβ for all (α, β).
Since zαβ = xα ⊗ yβ , for all α and β, it follows that checking the solvability of (5.4)
amounts to finding at least one system (5.7) that is solvable with C being a minimal
cover (i.e a set satisfying (5.6) that is minimal with respect to inclusion). This is
what Attack 1 actually does. 
Note that Theorem 5.1 was not formally stated and proved in [5].
Although the complexity of Attack 1 in terms of the maximal degree of polynomial
is non-polynomial, it is quite efficient when, for example, this maximal degree stays
bounded and the dimension of matrices is allowed to grow, see [5].
We now describe a version of Kotov and Ushakov attack that applies to Proto-
col 2 where we have tropical quasi-polynomials instead of polynomials. In this case,
instead of (5.1) we need to require that X, respectively Y , commute with any quasi-
polynomial of A, respectively of B. Obviously, it is then reasonable to seek X and
Y themselves in the form of quasi-polynomials.
5.2. Kotov and Ushakov attack on Protocol 2. We first select a big enough
finite subset T of rational numbers in [0, 1] such that, e.g., we have R ⊆ T with








then using (5.2) we impose
X ⊗W ⊗ Y =
⊕
α,β∈T




xα ⊗ yβ ⊗A(α) ⊗W ⊗B(β) = U.
(5.11)




xα ⊗ yβ ⊗ (A(α) ⊗W ⊗B(β) − U) = E,
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where E is a matrix of the same dimension as A or B with all entries equal to 0. As
we denote Tαβ = A(α) ⊗W ⊗B(β) − U , we can rewrite (5.12) as follows:
max
α,β∈T
(xα ⊗ yβ ⊗ Tαβγδ ) = 0, ∀γ, δ ∈ [n].
This system is very similar to (5.4): a system of the type “A⊗x = b” where the role
of unknowns is played by zαβ = xα + yβ . This leads us to the following attack:
Attack 2.
(1) Compute cαβ and Sαβ by (5.5), where T
αβ = A(α) ⊗ W ⊗ B(β) − U and
α, β ∈ T .




xα + yβ = cαβ , if (α, β) ∈ C,
xα + yβ ≤ cαβ , if (α, β) /∈ C.
Thus the Kotov-Ushakov attack on the Protocol 2 is very similar to the original
one. The proof of the following theorem is omitted, since it is also very similar to
that of Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.2. Let A,B,W ∈ Rn×nmax and U be the message sent by Alice to Bob
in Protocol 2. If R ⊆ T for any set R that can be used by Alice and Bob in that








that satisfy X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U .
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We implemented Attack 2 in GAP by modifying the existing code from [5]. Fig-
ure 1 and Figure 2 show how the the average computation time grows in practice as
we increase the maximal degree of monomials in tropical polynomial (Protocol 1) or
the maximal denominator of the degree of monomials in tropical quasi-polynomial
(Protocol 2).
Figure 1. (a) Dependence of average computation Attack 1 on the
maximal degree of tropical polynomials and (b) running time for
generating Ka or Kb in Protocol 1
On one hand, we see that the average computation time of the Kotov-Ushakov
attack grows quite rapidly with the increase of the maximal degree of tropical poly-
nomials or the maximal denominator of tropical quasi-polynomials. On the other
hand, this increase is not so dramatic, and a possible reason for this is the slow
growth of the average number of tested minimal covers, as reported in [5].
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Figure 2. (a) Dependence of average computation Attack 2 on the
maximal degree of tropical polynomials and (b) running time for
generating Ka or Kb in Protocol 2
6. Security of protocols using Linde – De la Puente matrices
6.1. Attacks on Protocol 3 in some special cases. Recall that Alice’s secret
key is Ka = A1 ⊗ V ⊗A2 = A1 ⊗B1 ⊗W ⊗B2 ⊗A2. Using Theorem 3.4, we obtain
Ka = (l1 ⊗A1 ⊕ k1 ⊗B1)⊗W ⊗ (k2 ⊗B2 ⊕ l2 ⊗A2)
= (l1 ⊗ k2 ⊗A1 ⊗W ⊗B2)⊕ (l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗A1 ⊗W ⊗A2)
⊕ (k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗B1 ⊗W ⊗B2)⊕ (k1 ⊗ l2 ⊗B1 ⊗W ⊗A2)
= (l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗ U)⊕ (k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ V )⊕ (l1 ⊗ k2 ⊗A1 ⊗W ⊗B2)
⊕ (k1 ⊗ l2 ⊗B1 ⊗W ⊗A2).
(6.1)
Let us discuss how Eve can find l1⊗ l2 and k1⊗ k2 and hence recover the first two
terms of the above expression (underlined).
Lemma 1. We have k1 ⊗ k2 = ust ⊗w−st and l1 ⊗ l2 = vst ⊗w−st, where s, t is any
pair of indices for which maxi,j wij = wst.
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Proof. We have
ust = k1 ⊗ wst ⊗ k2 ⊕
⊕
(s′,t′)6=(s,t)
(A1)ss′ ⊗ ws′t′ ⊗ (A2)t′t,
vst = l1 ⊗ wst ⊗ l2 ⊕
⊕
(s′,t′)6=(s,t)
(B1)ss′ ⊗ ws′t′ ⊗ (B2)t′t.
(6.2)
However, we also have (A1)ss′ ≤ k1, (A2)t′t ≤ k2, (B1)ss′ ≤ l1, (B2)t′t ≤ l2 and
ws′t′ ≤ wst, and therefore ust = k1 ⊗wst ⊗ k2 and vst = l1 ⊗wst ⊗ l2, and hence the
claim follows. 
Using Lemma 1 the attacker can recover l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗ U ⊕ k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ V which is the
underlined part of Ka = Kb. Let us consider the following special case when this
allows the attacker to recover the whole key.
Definition 12 (W is vanishing). W is called vanishing in A1 ⊗ W ⊗ A2 and
B1 ⊗W ⊗B2 if A1 ⊗W ⊗A2 = A1 ⊗A2 and B1 ⊗W ⊗B2 = B1 ⊗B2.
Theorem 6.1 (Attack when W is vanishing). If W is vanishing in A1 ⊗W ⊗A2
and B1 ⊗W ⊗B2, then
(6.3) Ka = Kb = l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗ U ⊕ k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ V,
where k1 ⊗ k2 = ust ⊗ w−st, and l1 ⊗ l2 = vst ⊗ w−st, and s, t is any pair of indices for
which maxi,j wij = wst.
Proof. Let U = A1 ⊗W ⊗A2 = A1 ⊗A2 and V = B1 ⊗W ⊗B2 = B1 ⊗B2. In this
case Kb = B1⊗A1⊗A2⊗B2 = Ka = K. Repeatedly applying Theorem 3.4 we find
that
K = k2 ⊗ l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗A1 ⊕ k1 ⊗ l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗A2
⊕ k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ l2 ⊗B1 ⊕ k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ l1 ⊗B2
= l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗ U ⊕ k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ V.
The expressions for k1 ⊗ k2 and l1 ⊗ l2 follow from Lemma 1. 
In our experiments, the case of vanishing W was not typical, occurring in no more
than about 1% experiments. When the range of the entries of W is much bigger
than that of other matrices (A(1), A(2), B(1) and B(2)), it is more natural to assume
that the following property holds.









and B(2) = (b
(2)
ij ) be n× n matrices over Rmax. Matrix W = (wij) ∈ Rn×nmax is called
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dominant in A(1) ⊗W ⊗A(2), B(1) ⊗W ⊗B(2), A(1) ⊗W ⊗B(2), A(1) ⊗W ⊗B(2),
if the following property
(A(1) ⊗W ⊗A(2))il = a(1)is ⊗ wst ⊗ a
(2)
tl ,
(B(1) ⊗W ⊗B(2))il = b(1)is ⊗ wst ⊗ b
(2)
tl ,
(A(1) ⊗W ⊗B(2))il = a(1)is ⊗ wst ⊗ b
(2)
tl ,




holds for all i, l and some s and t such that wst = maxi,j wij .
It turns out that we also can reconstruct the whole key in this case.
Theorem 6.2 (Attack when W is dominant). Suppose that W is dominant in
A(1) ⊗W ⊗A(2), B(1) ⊗W ⊗B(2), A(1) ⊗W ⊗B(2) and B(1) ⊗W ⊗A(2). Then the
entries of the key K = (kil) can be found as follows:
(6.5) kil = w
−
st ⊗ (vst ⊗ uil ⊕ ust ⊗ vil ⊕ uit ⊗ vsl ⊕ vit ⊗ usl).
Proof. Using (6.1) and (6.4), we obtain for the entries kil that
kil = (l1 ⊗ l2 ⊗ uil)⊕ (k1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ vil)⊕ (l1 ⊗ k2 ⊗ a(1)is ⊗ wst ⊗ b
(2)
tl )




The attacker can compute l1 ⊗ l2 and k1 ⊗ k2 as in Lemma 1: l1 ⊗ l2 = vst ⊗ w−st
and k1 ⊗ k2 = ust ⊗ w−st. To compute the rest, we observe that by (6.4)
uit = a
(1)
is ⊗ wst ⊗ a
(2)
tt , usl = a
(1)





is ⊗ wst ⊗ b
(2)
tt , vsl = b
(1)
ss ⊗ wst ⊗ b
(2)
tl ,
and recall that a
(2)
tt = k2, a
(1)
ss = k1, b
(2)
tt = l2 and b
(1)
ss = l1. Using this we then
obtain that
uit ⊗ w−st = a
(1)
is ⊗ k2, usl ⊗ w
−
st = k1 ⊗ a
(2)
tl ,
vit ⊗ w−st = b
(1)
is ⊗ l2, vsl ⊗ w
−
st = l1 ⊗ b
(2)
tl .
Substituting this into (6.6) we obtain
kil = vst ⊗ w−st ⊗ uil ⊕ ust ⊗ w−st ⊗ vil ⊕ uit ⊗ w−st ⊗ vsl ⊕ vit ⊗ w−st ⊗ usl,
which can be simplified to (6.5). 
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We also considered the formulae (6.3) and (6.5) as heuristic attacks on Protocol 3.
To analyze the success of these attacks we considered the following two parameters:
1) the success rate, i.e., the percentage of instances where the secret key Ka = Kb
is exactly equal to expression (6.3) or (6.5), 2) the similarity rate: the average
percentage of the entries of the matrix computed by (6.3) or (6.5) which are equal
to those in the secret key Ka = Kb in the case of “no success” when the matrix
computed by (6.3) or (6.5) does not coincide with the key. We performed 10000
times experiments for matrices of dimensions 5, 20, 30 and 40 and with entries
of W randomly selected in various ranges using Matlab R2018a. For the attack
based on (6.5), the results of our experiments are shown in Table 1. As we would
expect, both the average success rate and the average similarity rate grow with
the range of W . Also, the average success rate rapidly decreases with dimension,
while the change of similarity rate is rather insignificant. For the entries of W
randomly selected in [0, 100000] and other parameters within [−100, 100] and the
given four dimensions, the average success rate for the attack based on (6.5) becomes
overwhelming, indicating that in this case W is highly likely to be dominant.
The performance of the attack based on (6.3) for W in all ranges shown in Table 1
was quite poor: in all series of 10000 experiments, the average success rate did not
exceed 1.2% and the average similarity rate (among the unsuccessful cases) did not
exceed 2.1%.
In view of the success of simple heuristic attack based on (6.5), for which we
observed at least 85% similarity rate between the key and the outcome of this attack
in all our series of 10000 experiments, it is still challenging to suggest W that would
be in some sense guaranteed to withstand this attack and (6.3) and for which no
other obvious heuristic attacks would work. However, on the attacker’s side we still
would like to have an attack that can reconstruct Ka = Kb with certainty. Such
attack will be developed in the next subsections.
6.2. Generalized Kotov-Ushakov attack. Previous subsection yields a simple
but efficient enough heuristic attack on Protocol 3 based on (6.5). We now discuss
how the Kotov-Ushakov attack can be generalized to apply to both Protocol 3 and 4.
The main idea is to use tropical identity matrix and tropical elementary matrices
to generate the matrices from set [2r, r]kn, so that they will play the role of matrix
powers in the Kotov-Ushakov attack.
We first describe a generalization of the Kotov-Ushakov attack, which can be
then specialized to both protocols. In the generalized Kotov-Ushakov attack we seek
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Dimension of matrices 5 20 30 40
Success rate, entries of
W in [−5, 5]
17.81% 0.03% 0% 0%
Similarity rate, entries
of W in [−5, 5]
90.55% 86.17% 85.99% 85.18%
Success rate, entries of
W in [−50, 50]
45.44% 4.2% 1.59% 1.17%
Similarity rate, entries
of W in [−50, 50]
94.62% 94.18% 94.30% 94.47%
Success rate, entries of
W in [−100, 100]
66.8% 13.51% 6.99 % 3.62%
Similarity rate, entries
of W in [−100, 100]
97.41% 97.31% 97.53% 97.58%
Success rate, entries of
W in [−500, 500]
92.5% 35.13% 26.61% 22.17%
Similarity rate, entries
of W in [−500, 500]
98.38% 96.63% 97.23% 97.96%
Success rate, entries of
W in [−1000, 1000]
96.57% 44.88% 33.97% 29.02%
Similarity rate, entries
of W in [−1000, 1000]
99.70% 95.32% 94.40% 94.91%
Success rate, entries of
W in [−10000, 10000]
99.72% 85.87% 72.20% 59.51%
Similarity rate,
entries of W in
[−10000, 10000]
99.97% 98.35% 96.50% 94.44%
Success rate, en-
tries of W in
[−100000, 100000]
99.99% 98.68% 96.35% 92.66%
Similarity rate,
entries of W in
[−100000, 100000]
99.99% 99.87% 99.56% 99.15%
Table 1. Dependency of the success and similarity rate on dimen-
sion and the range of entries of W for the attack based on (6.5).
Parameters a, b are in the range [−20,−1], parameters c, d are in
the range [−100,−60], and k1, k2, l1, l2 are random positive num-
bers in the range [0, 100].
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X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U,
xα ∈ Xα(s), yβ ∈ Yβ(t).
(6.7)
Here {Aα : α ∈ A} and (respectively) {Bβ : β ∈ B} are the finite sets of matrices
such that any matrix that can be used by Alice and (respectively) by Bob can be
represented as in the first line of (6.7), provided that the coefficients xα and yβ
satisfy the conditions written in the last line of (6.7). In these conditions, Xα(s) and
Yβ(t) are subsets of R whose specification depends on vectors s and t of unknown
parameters.
The solution of (6.7) is based on the same ideas from [5] that were already used
in Subsection 5.2. After we substitute the first line of (6.7) into the decomposition
problem X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U and denote
(6.8) Tαβ = Aα ⊗W ⊗Bβ − U,
the decomposition problem reduces to solving the system
(6.9) max
α∈A,β∈B
(xα ⊗ yβ ⊗ Tαβγδ ) = 0, ∀γ, δ ∈ [n].
Here, unlike in Subsection 5.2, xα and yβ also satisfy the conditions in the last line
of (6.7). Our attack then aims to solve equation (6.9) with these conditions.
Attack 3 (Generalized Kotov-Ushakov).








(2) Among all minimal covers of [n] × [n] by Sαβ , that is, all minimal subsets




Sαβ = [n]× [n],
find a cover for which the system
(6.12)

xα + yβ = cαβ , if (α, β) ∈ C,
xα + yβ ≤ cαβ , if (α, β) /∈ C,
xα ∈ Xα(s), yβ ∈ Yβ(t)
is solvable.
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Note that we do not generally know the nature and the complexity of the condi-
tions xα ∈ Xα(s), yβ ∈ Yβ(t), and vectors s and t can themselves be constrained.
However, in the specifications of Attack 3 that will follow in the next subsections,
system (6.12) is always linear, so that its solvability can be checked by the simplex
method. The practical solvability of problem (6.12) depends on how Xα(s) and Yβ(t)
are specified. In both cases considered below these sets are intervals or points, so
that problem (6.12) is still a linear programming problem.
We now present a theorem about the validity of Attack 3.
Theorem 6.3. If (6.7) is solvable, then Attack 3 yields a solution to that system.




zαβ ⊗ Tαβγδ = 0 γ, δ ∈ [n],
which is a slight generalization of (5.9). The validity of Attack 3 is then implied by
the theory of A⊗ x = b ([1] Theorem 3.1.1 and Corollary 3.1.2), taking into account
that zαβ = xα ⊗ yβ , xα ∈ Xα(s) and yβ ∈ Yβ(t). 
6.3. Kotov-Ushakov attack on Protocol 3. In Protocol 3, we have A1 ∈ [2a, a]k1n
and A2 ∈ [2b, b]k2n with unknown nonpositive a, b, and unknown nonnegative k1 and
k2. Using tropical elementary matrices as Aα and Bβ with α and β being pairs of
indices from [n], we can represent any matrix in [2a, a]k1n and [2b, b]
k2
n as in the first
line of (6.7). However, for this we also need to restrict the coefficients xα to belong
to [2a, a] for some a ≤ 0 if α = (i, j) with i 6= j or to be equal to some k1 ≥ 0 if i = j.
Similarly, the coefficients yβ should belong to [2b, b] for some b ≤ 0 if β = (i, j) with
i 6= j or to be equal to some k2 ≥ 0 if i = j.
Formally, we set Aα and Bβ for α = β = (i, j) to be:
(6.14) Aα = A
ij = Bβ = B
ij = Eij ,
where (i, j) ∈ [n]2.
Sets X and Y satisfy
(6.15) X(i,j)(a, k) =
{
[2a, a], i 6= j
{k}, i = j.
(6.16) Y(i,j)(b, l) =
{
[2b, b], i 6= j
{l}, i = j,
where k, l ≥ 0 and a, b ≤ 0.
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We now write, essentially, a specialization of Attack 3 to Protocol 3 in the case
where A and B both equal to the set of elementary matrices (which is in one-to-one
correspondence with [n]2).
Attack 4.
(1) For all α = (i, j) ∈ [n]2 and β = (s, t) ∈ [n]2, compute
cijst = cαβ = min
γ,δ∈[n]
(−Tαβγδ )




where Aα, Bβ are defined by (6.14) and T
αβ by (6.8) (where α = (i, j),
β = (s, t) with i, j, s, t ∈ [n]).




Sαβ = [n]× [n],
find a cover for which the system
xij + yst = cijst, for (i, j, s, t) ∈ C
xij + yst ≤ cijst, otherwise,
2a ≤ xij ≤ a, 2b ≤ yst ≤ b, ∀i 6= j, s 6= t,
xii = k1, yss = k2, ∀i, s,
a, b ≤ 0, k1, k2 ≥ 0.
(6.19)
is solvable.
Note that this linear system of equalities and inequalities whose solvability can be
checked by the simplex method.
We now explain why the attack is valid.
Theorem 6.4. Let W ∈ Rn×nmax and let U be the message sent by Alice to Bob in
Protocol 3. Then Attack 4 yields matrices X ∈ [2a, a]k1n and Y ∈ [2b, b]k2n for some
a, b ≤ 0 and k1, k2 ≥ 0 that satisfy X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U .
Proof. In this case we have to solve system (6.7) with Aα and Bβ being tropical
elementary matrices and with A = B being the set of all such matrices, and with the
sets that contain xα and yα taking the forms of (6.15) and (6.16) respectively, also
with the conditions a, b ≤ 0 and k1, k2 ≥ 0 on the parameters of these sets. This
system is the same as X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U where it is required that X ∈ [2a, a]k1n and
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Y ∈ [2b, b]k2n for some a, b ≤ 0 and k1, k2 ≥ 0. The latter system has a solution since
U is the message sent by Alice to Bob in Protocol 3.
Since (6.12) in this case becomes (6.19), Attack 4 is indeed a specialization of
Attack 3, and by Theorem 6.3 it finds a solution to the above described specialization
of system (6.7), and hence it finds Linde-De la Puente matrices X and Y which satisfy
X ⊗W ⊗ Y = U . 
6.4. Kotov-Ushakov attack on Protocol 4. In Protocol 4, we have A1 ∈ [2a, a]kn
and A2 ∈ [0, l]n (where [0, l]n is the set of n× n matrices whose all entries belong to
[0, l]) with unknown nonpositive a and unknown nonnegative k and l. Using tropical
elementary matrices and I as Aα and only tropical elementary matrices as Bβ with α
and β being pairs of indices from {1, . . . , n}, we can represent any matrix in [2a, a]kn
and [0, l]n as in the first line of (6.7). However, for this we also need to restrict the
coefficients xα to belong to [2a, a] for some a ≤ 0 if α = (i, j) with i 6= j or to be
equal to k if i = j. The coefficients yβ should belong to [0, l] for any β = (i, j) with
i, j ∈ [n].
Formally, we set Aα and Bβ for each α = β = (i, j) to be the tropical elementary
matrix Eij . Here again (i, j) ∈ [n]2.
Sets X and Y satisfy
(6.20) X(i,j)(a) =
{
[2a, a], i 6= j
{k}, i = j.
(6.21) Y(i,j) = [0, l] ∀i, j.
Observe that k and l are not parameters in this case, since Alice and Bob are sending
them to one another, so we have to assume that they can be intercepted by Eve.
However, a is an unknown parameter satisfying a ≤ 0.
Hence we suggest the following attack.
Attack 5.
(1) Compute cαβ = cijst and Sαβ = Sijst by (6.17), where Aα and Bβ are defined
by (6.14) and Tαβ by (6.8) for α = (i, j) and β = (s, t) with i, j, s, t ∈ [n].
(2) Among the minimal sets C ⊆ [n]2 × [n]2 that satisfy (6.18) we seek those
which satisfy
xij + yst = cijst, for (i, j, s, t) ∈ C
xij + yst ≤ cijst, otherwise,
2a ≤ xij ≤ a, ∀i 6= j, xii = g,∀i
0 ≤ yst ≤ h ∀s, t, a ≤ 0.
(6.22)
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Note that this is a linear system of equalities and inequalities whose solvability
can be checked by the simplex method. The proof of the validity of this attack is
similar to that of Theorem 6.4 and is omitted.
7. Conclusions and further research
Using the results previously obtained in [2] and [6] and extending them, we de-
scribed two useful classes of commuting matrices in tropical algebra and suggested
some new implementations of Stickel’s protocol based on them. For one of these im-
plementations we developed two simple attacks which, strictly speaking, work only
in very special situations but one of them can be rather successfully used as heuris-
tic attack in a general situation. We also showed how the Kotov-Ushakov attack
can be generalized to apply to all of our protocols. We analyzed the performance of
this attack on the tropical Stickel protocol suggested by [3] and our new modification
that uses quasi-polynomials. We conclude that the Kotov-Ushakov attack works well
when the number of generators (Aα and Bβ) is limited, but the complexity quickly
grows as the number of these generators increases. This means that the Kotov-
Ushakov attack is not really so successful for big D in the tropical Stickel protocol
of [3] (Protocol 1) as well as when too large subsets of rational numbers in [0, 1] are
used in the protocol with quasi-polynomials (Protocol 2). We also do not expect it
to be successful for large n in the protocols with [2r, r]kn matrices (Protocols 3 and 4).
Therefore, it still makes sense to search for alternative attacks on our new protocols.
For Protocol 3, since at least one rather successful heuristic attack has been found,
it is neccessary to look for a class of matrices W that will safeguard against such
attacks.
Intuitively, matrix commutativity in tropical algebra should be more common than
in the usual algebra and it is a promising topic of research of independent interest.
Besides that, some new protocols using tropical algebra have been recently sug-
gested in [4]. Unlike the previous tropical implementations of Stickel protocol, these
new protocols use more sophisticated algebraic tools such as semi-direct product, and
therefore they are immune to Kotov-Ushakov attack and present a new interesting
object of study.
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